报告题目：Facility Location Games: From Origin to Recent Development
报 告 人：李闽溟 香港城市大学
报告摘要：Mechanism Design, as one of the important areas in algorithmic game theory, can be classified into two categories: with money and without money. Facility location game is one of the mostly studied problem in mechanism design without money. Procaccia and tennenholtz proposed and studied the problem back in 2009, where there are n agents on a line and the government will build a facility in a certain location given the agents reported information on their positions. Since every agent wants the facility to be closer to her, the government wants to make sure truth-telling is the best strategy for every agent while achieving some optimization objective. Since then, some bounds on the approximation ratios of the truthful mechanisms have been improved and new models are proposed. In this talk, we will briefly explain the story of the classic model and emphasize on the recent new models proposed by us and other groups.
报告人简介：李闽溟分别于2002年和2006年在清华大学计算机科学与技术系获得学士和博士学位。之后赴香港城市大学任助理教授，现为教授。他的研究兴趣包括算法博弈论，算法设计与分析以及组合优化。他在PNAS，SIAM Journal on Computing, IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing等期刊上发表论文80篇；在NeurIPS，ICML，AAAI，AAMAS，IJCAI等国际会议上发表论文100余篇。目前为ACM Distinguished Speaker。
报告时间：2023年10月12日 15:00-16:00
报告地点：文渊楼 B208
主办单位：伟德国际1946源自英国
